We study the impact of a powerful non-financial stakeholder -unionized workers -on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies, and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms' takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders' wealth.
Introduction
There has long been an interest in understanding how non-financial stakeholders, especially labor unions, affect firms' decisions and ultimately their performance. The literature on labor unions generally concludes that unions reduce firms' values (e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984; Abowd, 1989; Hirsch, 1991; Lee and Mas, 2009 ). This evidence, however, is solely based on equity values and thus the above conclusion does not explicitly consider any effect unions may have on debt values.
In this paper, we focus on unionized workers to address the question of how powerful nonfinancial stakeholders, through their influence on corporate matters, affect debt values. Our conceptual framework is based on the view that non-financial stakeholders can influence firms' decisions, for example by threatening to withdraw their contributions to the firm, and thus they can play a prominent role in firms' internal governance structures. This view is supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , who emphasize that firms' decisions are the outcome of a bargaining process among all stakeholders. More recently, Acharya et al. (2009) argue that to better understand the source of agency problems, one has to study a firm as composed of diverse agents with different horizons, opportunities, and interests, rather than as a monolithic single-employee entity. Furthermore, the interaction between different types of stakeholders in the political arena may shape country-level corporate governance systems (e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 2005a; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006) . This stakeholder view of corporations naturally suggests that labor unions' influence on corporate affairs may affect lenders' assessments of a firm's default risk and thus the value of its debt. But how unions' influence impacts debt values is a priori unclear. On one hand, workers' interests are often closely aligned with those of bondholders: In solvent states, both workers and bondholders receive payoffs that are largely insensitive to a firm's performance; they also receive lower payoffs in bankruptcy. Thus, both may favor corporate policies that reduce the likelihood of default. Consequently, workers' influence on corporate matters might benefit bondholders, thus increasing debt values and lowering bond yields. On the other hand, once the company approaches bankruptcy, workers become more concerned with a potential loss of their human capital invested in the firm and their future income; hence, they may oppose an efficient liquidation that benefits creditors. As a result, workers may align themselves with shareholders in trying to keep the firm alive by undertaking activities capable of diluting creditors' wealth. In this case, workers' influence on corporate matters may hurt bondholders and increase bond yields.
To resolve this issue, we use the industry labor force unionization rate (the fraction of workers in a Census Industry Classification (CIC) industry that are unionized) as a proxy for the influence of workers on corporate affairs and uncover new evidence that unions have a nontrivial impact on bond yields. Our results suggest that unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because their influence on corporate affairs serves as a mechanism that protects bondholders' wealth. Firms in more unionized industries have statistically lower bond yields, even after controlling for financial leverage and several firm and debt characteristics that are known to affect yields. The results are also economically significant: A one-standard-deviation increase in the industry unionization rate decreases bond yields by about 32 basis points. In addition, we find that creditors view workers' influence on corporate affairs more favorably when firms are in financial distress. Notably, this finding holds even when we include CIC industry fixed effects in our regression model; hence, omitted time-invariant characteristics correlated with unionization are unlikely to explain our results.
Subsequently, we entertain alternative explanations of our findings. First, labor unions are considered an industry phenomenon and thus unionization may proxy for an industry characteristic, such as the stage of the industry life cycle, its capital or knowledge intensity. Our empirical model includes several firm-and industry-level characteristics that could be correlated with such industry effects, including Tobin's Q, cash-flow risk, industry concentration, and industry fixed effects. We additionally include industry-level variables that directly proxy for the stage of the industry life cycle (old-and new-economy status, R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure, growth, and profitability), capital intensity (capital-labor ratio), and knowledge intensity (the fraction of industry workers with college education and the average number of working hours per employee in the industry).
Second, the effect of unionization on bond yields may be driven by the correlation between industry unionization rates and the strength of corporate governance mechanisms in place. Our results are robust to the inclusion of common proxies for governance, such as the level and concentration of institutional ownership and the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) .
Third, we examine whether the magnitude of our results is biased due to selection or measurement error. The estimated magnitude of the unions' effect might be biased upwards if unions self-select to less risky industries; conversely, the magnitude might be biased downwards if unions sort into riskier industries. Also, since we use industry-level unionization rates to proxy for firm-level rates, another reason for such downward bias could be measurement error. Using the fraction of female workers in a firm's CIC industry as an instrument, we show that such bias in our estimates is statistically insignificant. Another way to evaluate the impact of measurement error is to conduct our tests at the industry level. We thus convert the bond yields and other firm-level variables into industry-level averages. The evidence is similar to the firm-level evidence.
Next, we shed light on the mechanism through which unions might affect bond values. One possibility is that unionized workers might curb shareholders' incentives to shift risk onto bondholders. In line with this conjecture, we find that firms in more unionized industries spend a smaller fraction of their investment budgets on risky R&D than they do on physical assets.
Moreover, this effect is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions, that is, in firms in which shareholders have more incentives to take excessive risk.
Another possibility is that unions might deter takeovers, which are associated with changes in firms' contracting relationships that shift wealth from workers to shareholders (e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) . This activity may lower debt risk, since takeovers often entail increases in leverage which reduce the value of existing debt that is not fully protected by covenants, and the managers of acquisition targets often engage in defensive maneuvers that reduce debt values. Supporting this view, we find that firms in more unionized industries are less likely to be acquisition targets, and that unionization reduces bond yields by more when takeover barriers are lower.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that unions may reduce bond yields by mobilizing the media and politicians to the rescue of financially troubled firms. Last, in distressed firms unionized workers may sometimes side with shareholders in an attempt to avoid liquidations that would benefit lenders.
Our evidence cannot rule out this possibility, but suggests that the net effect of unions' influence on corporate matters is a reduction in debt risk.
Our results can also be cast in a broader supply and demand framework in which unionization affects both the equilibrium price and amount of debt. Our arguments suggest that, by helping protect creditors' wealth, an increase in unionization causes an increase in the supply of debt to the firm. Supporting this view, we find that unionization significantly reduces bond yields. But our further tests show that unionization does not affect firms' financial leverage. Hence, an increase in unionization is also accompanied by a decrease in the firms' demand for debt. This could occur because more unionized firms choose lower financial leverage to offset higher operating leverage which results from unions' opposition to wage cuts and layoffs (Simintzi et al., 2009) , or because unions induce managers to choose lower financial leverage to reduce workers' exposure to unemployment risk (Berk et al., 2010) .
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our conceptual framework and related literature. Section 3 describes the data and main variables. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 sheds light on the mechanism through which unions might affect bond yields.
Section 6 presents several robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
Conceptual Framework and Related Literature

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The role of powerful workers in the pricing of risky debt is a priori uncertain and depends on creditors' perception of how workers' future actions might affect the risk of default on debt payments. On one hand, workers' influence on corporate affairs may protect bondholders' wealth and thus reduce bond yields. Workers' contractual claims on firm value resemble the payoff to risky debt: In solvency, workers receive a largely fixed payoff, equivalent to the present value of all future wages and benefits and do not gain much from improvements in firms' performance; this payoff is lower in bankruptcy, when firms are unable to fulfill their contractual obligations.
1 Furthermore, upon liquidation, workers may lose the value of their firm-specific human capital. Since both workers and bondholders are largely fixed claimants, their interests are likely to be closely aligned in supporting actions which decrease the probability that the firm will default on debt payments.
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Specifically, workers may reduce the risk of debt in three main ways. First, both workers and lenders are adversely affected by shareholders' incentives to engage in risky investment projects that shift wealth from fixed claimants to themselves (Fama, 1990) . Therefore, influential workers strive for policies that support less risky investments. Second, workers may oppose takeovers, which are often associated with changes in firms' contracting relationships that shift wealth from workers to shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) . A lower likelihood of a takeover reduces debt risk, since takeovers often entail increases in leverage which reduce the value of existing debt that is not fully protected by covenants (Warga and Welch, 1993) . Also, managers of target firms often recapitalize the firms, refocus them, and increase payouts to shareholders, all of which can reduce these firms' debt values (Klock et. al., 2005) . 3 Third, in times of distress, organized labor may mobilize the media and politicians to the rescue of firms in financial trouble: Firms with stronger labor are more likely to be bailed out.
On the other hand, workers' influence on corporate affairs may hurt bondholders' wealth and thus increase bond yields. In pricing debt claims, rational lenders anticipate that their interests could conflict with those of workers in the event that the firm needs to be liquidated. In liquidation, creditors recover an amount that is proportional to the firm's liquidation value. Thus, on the verge of bankruptcy, creditors would strive for corporate policies that maximize the liquidation value. In contrast, irrespective of the liquidation value, in bankruptcy workers lose their firm-specific human capital investments as well as the future income streams they would have received had the firm remained solvent. Hence, workers may strive for policies that avoid liquidation rather than those that maximize the liquidation value. It is then possible that in firms that are close to bankruptcy workers would oppose an efficient liquidation that would benefit creditors. 4 Workers would instead align themselves with shareholders in undertaking risky activities to keep the firm alive.
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In light of the conflicting views, whether workers' influence on corporate affairs implies higher or lower bond yields remains an empirical issue. We follow previous work in labor economics (e.g., Connolly et al., 1986; Bronars and Deere, 1991) and use labor force unionization rates as a proxy for the influence of workers on corporate decisions. The choice of unionization is well suited for this context. First, organized labor is better able to coordinate workers' actions. This improved coordination leads to a more effective communication between workers and management and allows unionized workers to use their market power to exert pressure on management (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) . Second, because unionized workers are locked into the firm with their firm-specific human capital investments, they have strong incentives to monitor management's actions to ensure that the firm remains healthy. Moreover, they possess a special monitoring ability that stems from their unique access to information regarding corporate policies, which in turn comes from their dayto-day involvement with the firm (Schwab and Thomas, 1998) .
In addition, ample evidence illustrates various channels through which labor unions, representing a large fraction of workers, may affect corporate decisions. First, Gray et al. (1999) document that about 47% of contemporaneous collective agreements contain some form of "partnership" that provides unions with a voice in important firms' decisions. Second, unions engage in boycotts, picketing, strikes, and public denouncements when firms' decisions counter their interests. Third, unions increasingly resort to a wide array of tactics broadly termed as union corporate campaigns, which range from consumer boycotts, lawsuits, and public relations schemes to proxy contests. Fourth, in some companies, employees hold a non-negligible fraction of their companies' shares, either directly or through their pension plans, and thus they can use their voting power to advance labor's agenda (Faleye et al., 2006; Agrawal, 2008) . Finally, a handful of large U.S.
firms have boards with union representations, which arise as a result of either employee stock ownership plans or of collective bargaining agreements.
Our empirical strategy involves the following steps. We first determine the average effect of labor unionization on bond yields. Since workers' actions may have more impact on creditors'
wealth when firms are in financial distress, we next study whether the effect of workers on bond yields differs across financially distressed and healthy firms. Finally, we shed light on the mechanism through which unions affect bond values.
RELATED LITERATURE
Recent literature examines the market assessment of debt repayment risk through the lens of agency theory. One strand of this literature focuses on how ownership structure affects the cost of debt. Bagnani et al. (1994) document a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premium in the 5 to 25 percent ownership range; Anderson et al. (2003) show that founding family ownership reduces bond yields; Ortiz-Molina (2006) finds that, in pricing debt issues, bondholders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from managerial equity ownership; Billett and Liu (2007) find in their sample of dual-class firms that bond yields increase with managerial voting rights and decrease with cash-flow rights.
Another strand of literature studies how corporate governance affects the cost of debt. These papers find that bond yields are negatively related to board independence (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) , disclosure quality (Sengupta, 1998) , antitakeover provisions (Klock et al., 2005) , analyst coverage and forecast accuracy (Mansi et al., 2009a) , and more restrictive payout statutes (Mansi et al., 2009b) . Cremers et al. (2007) further consider the interactions of takeover vulnerability with the existence of large institutional shareholders, and Ellul et al. (2007) study the effect of family ownership in high and low investor-protection environments. Moreover, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) show that better governance improves bond ratings.
Our study is novel in that it shows that powerful non-financial stakeholders, such as unionized workers, may influence corporate affairs in ways that have a nontrivial impact on creditors' wealth.
Our evidence suggests that labor unions increase bond values because, through the various channels described in Section 2.1, they decrease the probability that firms will default on debt payments. Chen et al. (2009) show that unions also reduce firms' operating flexibility and increase the required return on equity. This suggests that, through this channel, unions may also decrease bond values. Our results show that the effect of unions on bond values through channels that protect creditors' wealth dominates any effect unions may have through the operating flexibility channel.
As we note it in the introduction, previous work documents that labor unions reduce equity values. We extend this work by showing that labor unions increase debt values. Moreover, our results add to the evidence in previous studies that governance attributes which are not beneficial to shareholders can nevertheless be beneficial to bondholders (Klock et al., 2005) .
More broadly, our paper is related to studies on the importance of labor relations for firms' decisions and their values (e.g., Fauver and Fuerst, 2006; Faleye et al., 2006; Edmans, 2007; Atanassov and Kim, 2009 ). Our work is also related to studies that examine the importance of various non-financial stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers, for corporate decisions (e.g., Kale and Shahrur, 2007) . We differ from these literatures in that we examine the importance of labor unions and their impact on the pricing of risky debt.
Last, our paper is related to the literature on the political economy of corporate governance. Pagano and Volpin (2005a) show that poor country-level protection of minority investors may result from a political alliance between workers and controlling shareholders; Pagano and Volpin (2005b) show that a similar alliance between managers and employees can occur also at the individual company level (see also Hellwig, 2000) . In addition, Perotti and von Thadden (2006) To ensure that accounting information and unionization rates are already impounded into bond yields, we match our bond data for year t with accounting information for the fiscal year ending in year t-1 and unionization rates for year t-1. Our final data span the period 1984-1998, which is the period for which both bond and unionization data are available. We further restrict our sample to firms in the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database. Finally, we exclude financial companies (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4999). 6 Our final sample contains 996 firms and a total of 5,557 firm-year observations for which we have complete data on all variables needed.
LABOR FORCE UNIONIZATION AND BOND YIELD SPREADS
Following previous work in labor economics (e.g., Connolly et al., 1986) , we measure labor force unionization (Union) as the percentage of workers in a Census Industry Classification (CIC) industry covered by unions in the collective bargaining with the firm. The CIC industries correspond roughly to the three-digit SIC industries. To the extent that the industry-level unionization is a noisy proxy for firm-level unionization, this measurement problem should only bias towards zero our 6 We exclude regulated gas and electric utilities because they have considerably less discretion in their choice of investment and are unlikely to provide shareholders with significant scope for opportunistic behavior that reduces the value of creditors' claims. This exclusion is important for our study since utilities are highly unionized but have a low cost of debt largely due to regulation. Nevertheless, our results are unaffected if we include utilities in our sample.
estimates of the impact of unionization on the cost of debt. We measure a firm's cost of debt in basis points using the yield spread, Spread, which reflects the market assessment of the firm's debt repayment risk. It is defined as the difference between the weighted-average yield to maturity of the firm's outstanding debt (the weight on each individual bond yield is the bond's share in the firm's total value of debt) and the yield to maturity of a Treasury bond with a similar duration.
To understand the source and amount of variation in industry unionization and firms' bond yield spreads, in Table I we report summary statistics of unionization rates and average bond yield spreads for the ten most-and the ten least-unionized industries. We observe a significant variation in unionization rates across different industries. Railroads, steelworks, pulp and paper, and motor vehicles are among the most unionized industries, with the average unionization rates above 50%
during the period 1983-1997. In contrast, small retail industries are generally not unionized, and their average unionization rate is about 2%. We also observe a decreasing trend in unionization rates over time, with aggregate unionization falling from 30% in 1983 to 17% in 1997.
We further inspect the cross-sectional and time-series variation in unionization rates and bond yields using regression analysis. By regressing Union on CIC industry fixed effects we find that 93% of the total variation in unionization rates is due to variation across CIC industries, which implies that the time-series variation for individual industries only accounts for the remaining 7%. Hence, cross-sectional differences in the industry unionization rates are the primary source of variation in our key independent variable. A firm's average yield spread is fairly persistent and it varies more across firms at a given time than it does for a given firm over time. By regressing Spread on firm fixed effects we find that about 60% of the variation in spreads is across firms and about 40% constitutes a within-firm time-series variation. In our analysis, we use the large cross-sectional variation in unionization rates and bond yields to study the effect of unions on debt risk.
Last, Table I also provides preliminary (univariate) evidence of a negative association between unionization and bond yields: The median yield spread among the most unionized industries is 215.5 basis points while the median yield spread among the least unionized industries is 294.4 basis points.
We thoroughly explore this result using a multivariate regression approach in Section 4.
CONTROL VARIABLES IN THE YIELD SPREAD REGRESSIONS
Firm characteristics are defined as follows. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's book debt plus the market value of equity. Finlev is the book value of debt over total assets. Tobin's Q, TobQ, is the market value of assets (total book debt plus market value of equity plus liquidation value of preferred stock minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits) over the book value of assets.
Cash-flow risk, Cfrisk, is the standard deviation of quarterly ROA using observations from 15 previous quarters. Intcov1 is an indicator variable equal to one if interest coverage, defined as operating cash flow divided by interest payments, is less than one, and zero otherwise. Profit is operating income over assets. Negequity is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm's book equity is negative, and zero otherwise. Intang is intangible assets over total assets. Net working capital, NWC, is current assets minus current liabilities, over total assets. Total payout to shareholders, Totpayout, is dividends plus repurchases, over total assets. Productivity is sales over assets. HHI is the HerfindahlHirschman Index of sales concentration in a firm's three-digit SIC industry. Nasdaq is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is listed on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise.
A firm's debt characteristics are weighted averages of the individual bond characteristics, that is, in each year, we aggregate individual bonds by weighting their characteristics by their shares in the total amount of the firm's outstanding debt. Duration is the weighted-average duration of outstanding debt. Debtage is the weighted-average difference between the settlement date and the original bond issue date. Rating is a weighted-average debt rating index that equals 1 for S&P's credit ratings D to CC, 2 for CCC-to CCC+, 3 for B-to B+, 4 for BB-to BB+, 5 for BBB-to BBB+, 6
for A-to A+, 7 for AA-to AA+, and 8 for AAA to AAA+. To ensure the robustness of our results with respect to outliers we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level. 
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Multivariate Analysis
LABOR UNIONS AND YIELD SPREADS
Since the vast majority of the variation in unionization rates is across industries, throughout the paper, we identify the effect of labor unions on yield spreads using empirical tests that largely rely on this contemporaneous industry heterogeneity. Specifically, we regress firm-level yield spreads on lagged industry unionization rates and several firm-and industry-level controls 7 :
Our controls include Size, Finlev, TobQ, Cfrisk, Intcov1, Profit, Negequity, Intang, NWC, Totpayout,  Productivity, HHI, and Nasdaq. Notably, including financial leverage in the regression model helps us control for any effect unions may have on the cost of debt through their possible influences on capital structure decisions (see Simintzi et al., 2009 ). We also include three debt characteristics:
Duration, Debtage, and Rating. The duration of debt controls for differences in maturity and coupon 7 One could also convert yield spreads and controls into CIC industry-level averages and estimate the regression models at the industry level either by OLS or by WLS using the number of firms in the industry as weights. This approach provides results that are similar to those we obtain in our firm-level analysis.
rates of the firm's debt. The debt age (the length of time the bond has been outstanding) controls for differences in bond liquidity, since previous work shows that more recently issued bonds are more liquid than older ones. The rating index controls for differences in default risk. Finally, unless otherwise noted, in all regressions, we include year and one-digit SIC industry fixed effects.
We estimate our models using pooled (panel) OLS regressions and calculating standard errors clustered at the CIC industry level. This approach specifically addresses the concern that Union is an industry-level variable but Spread and most of the controls are firm-level variables. It is thus possible that the errors, conditional on the independent variables, are correlated within industry groupings.
One reason why this may occur is that industry factors may have a similar effect on the risk of debt for all firms in the industry. Clustered errors assume that observations are independent across industries, but not necessarily independent within industries. The clustering method makes minimal assumptions about the correlation structure of the error term, and thus it is likely to provide the most conservative standard errors. Table III reports results from the regression models in which we sequentially add various control variables. In column (6), our most comprehensive specification, we include firms' debt ratings, which further control for various risk characteristics (e.g., debt covenants) that are observed by rating agencies but not necessarily by econometricians. 8 Across all specifications, we find a negative and highly statistically significant relation between unionization and yield spreads. This relation is economically significant. Based on the estimates in column (6), a one-standard-deviation increase in the unionization rate decreases the yield spread by about 32 basis points. For robustness, in column (7), we report results from estimating a parsimonious specification in which we exclude control variables that are not statistically significant in our benchmark specification: Intang, Totpayout, Productivity, HHI, Nasdaq, and Debtage. The coefficient of Union and the fit of the model remain similar. In sum, the results show that the influence of unions on corporate matters is viewed favorably in the bond market, consistent with the view that such influence serves as a mechanism that protects bondholders' wealth.
CONDITIONING ON FINANCIAL DISTRESS
We now study whether the effect of unionized workers on bond yields differs across financially distressed and healthy firms. The reason is that, regardless of its nature, workers' influence on corporate affairs should have more impact on creditors' wealth in financially distressed firms. In particular, in distress, unions may: (1) play a more important role in curbing shareholders' incentives to engage in risky activities that increase equity values but reduce debt values, (2) block takeovers of troubled firms, (3) mobilize political forces to bail out firms, or (4) side with shareholders to avoid liquidations that would benefit lenders. In line with the first three channels, unionization should decrease by more yields in distressed firms, but the last force would predict the opposite. Hence, whether the effect should be stronger or weaker in distressed firms is a priori unclear.
To resolve this issue, we condition the effect of unionization on yield spreads on various proxies for a firm's financial distress. We consider five different indicators of financial distress, broadly denoted Distress, which are based on interest coverage, book equity, Altman's (1968) z-score, Ohlson's (1980) o-score, and the simplified probability of default measure based on Merton's (1974) bond-pricing model suggested by Bharath and Shumway (2008) . Specifically, firms are classified as distressed when their interest coverage ratios are less than one (Intcov1), they have negative equity (Negequity), or their default risk falls into the top tercile of the empirical distribution according to zscores (LowZS), o-scores (HighOS), and probability of default (HighPD). 9 The advantage of the last measure is its forward-looking aspect and reliance on a completely specified default model, while the 9 By construction, default risk is higher for lower z-scores and higher o-scores.
other ones are largely ex-post measures and some rely on in-sample estimates of predictive regressions; thus, they are not robust to structural changes.
10 Table IV reports the results from estimating regression models with the following specification:
Controls denotes the full vector of control variables we use in Table III In addition to year fixed effects, in all empirical models we include CIC industry fixed effects to address the concern that omitted time-invariant industry characteristics may drive our results.
Unfortunately, this procedure does not allow us to identify the effect of Union on bond yields (β 1 ) because unionization rates are highly persistent. However, the interactions of Union with Distress exhibit substantially more time-series variation within each industry, inherited from the distress variables. Thus, we gain statistical power to identify the coefficients of the interaction terms (β 2 ).
For all the five alternative definitions of financial distress, we find that the coefficient of the interaction between Union and Distress is negative and statistically significant, that is, unionization reduces firms' bond yield spreads by more in financially distressed firms. 12 Even though our results cannot rule out the possibility that labor unions may still favor some corporate policies that reduce 10 Although we use indicator variables to capture financial distress, our results are qualitatively similar if we use continuous versions of interest coverage, z-scores, o-scores, or probability of default.
11 Our results remain similar if we use the distress indicators to split the sample into distressed and healthy firms.
12 The coefficients of the interaction terms are similar when we use one-digit SIC industry fixed effects as in Table III ; in that case we also find a negative and statistically significant effect of Union.
creditors' wealth when firms are in financial distress, they suggest that the actions of labor unions which protect creditors' wealth in distressed firms are more important, and as a result the net effect of labor unions is a lower risk of debt. Further, the analysis using CIC industry fixed effects gives us some comfort that our results are unlikely driven by omitted time-invariant industry characteristics correlated with unionization. If this were the case, then one would have to explain why these omitted variables have a stronger effect on yield spreads when firms are financially distressed.
OMITTED INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Our results may be spuriously driven by the correlation between unionization and an industry characteristic omitted from our model. In particular, the relation between unionization and yields may reflect the stage in an industry's life cycle. In fact, mature industries tend to be more unionized and less risky; thus, they may have lower bond yields. Moreover, some industries rely more on unskilled labor that tends to be more unionized; at the same time, these industries have lower costs of debt due to their ample collateralizable assets and less scope for discretion in investment policies.
In contrast, collective bargaining with unions is less relevant in knowledge-intensive industries, in which workers are more heterogeneous and often have individually negotiated contracts.
To address these concerns, we expand our main specification with several industry-level variables that proxy for the stage of the industry's life cycle, including the industry capital intensity and the relative importance of human capital. Mature industries differ from other industries in that they tend to be older and more capital intensive, have lower growth prospects, invest less in research and development and advertising, are potentially less profitable, and have better access to external capital. We explicitly control for industry age, defined as the logarithm of the maximum firm age in that industry (Indlogage), the industry's old-economy (Oldecon) and new-economy (Newecon) status 13 , 13 We define new-economy industries as the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking industries.
Old-economy industries are those with SIC codes below 4000 that are not new economy. the industry's capital-labor ratio (Indkl), median industry R&D expenses to sales ratio (IndR&Dexp), median industry advertising expenses to sales ratio (Indadvexp), median industry one-year asset growth (1yr-Indgrwth), median industry ROA (Indprofit), and median industry ratio of retained earnings to assets (Indretearn). Including Indkl addresses the concern that higher unionization could be associated with lower yields due to its correlation with an industry's capital intensity.
Several of the variables above serve as proxies for the nature of the production process in the industry and also measure the extent to which an industry relies on unionized unskilled labor (e.g.,
Oldecon and Newecon, Indkl, or IndR&Dexp). In addition, we directly control for differences in the level of education of the industry's labor force using the fraction of the CIC industry's workers that have at least some college education (College). We further control for the average number of hours worked by the workers in the CIC industry (Hours), since this variable may also proxy for the nature of the production process or the qualification of the labor force.
The results, presented in Table V , show that the effect of unionization on bond yields is essentially unchanged when we add the above industry variables. Thus, our findings cannot be attributed to the correlation between Union and the stage in the industry's life cycle or the extent to which an industry's production process is reliant on unionized unskilled labor.
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
Our conceptual framework assumes that managers strictly adhere to share price maximization.
In practice, the extent to which managers will act on behalf of shareholders to maximize the value of equity at the expense of the value of debt will also depend on firms' governance structures. Our empirical tests so far do not account for differences in governance and thus may suffer from an omitted-variable bias. Specifically, our coefficient estimates could be biased upwards if the extent to which managers can deviate from share price maximization were systematically higher among firms in more unionized industries. Hence, these firms could have lower bond yields simply because their risk-averse managers have, for example, more freedom to pursue less risky strategies.
To address this concern, we focus on two key aspects of a firm's governance structure: the presence of large shareholders and shareholder rights. Managers of firms with large investors and with stronger shareholder rights have less freedom to deviate from share-price maximization. First, large shareholders have incentives and power to limit managerial discretion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) , even if they lack substantial control rights (Edmans, 2009 ). In particular, large institutional investors are active in monitoring managerial actions (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000) and in enforcing compensation contracts with high pay-performance sensitivities (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) . In addition, shareholder rights are beneficial to shareholders because they constrain managerial discretion. Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with strong shareholder rights have higher long-run stock returns and higher profits relative to firms with strong management rights. Also, Klock et al. (2005) show that strong management rights are viewed favorably by bondholders.
To capture the differences in various aspects of corporate governance, we expand the set of control variables in our main specification. Like Hartzell and Starks (2003) , we measure institutional investors' influence on corporate matters using the concentration of their holdings, defined as the fraction of the firm's institutional ownership accounted for by the top five institutional investors (Top5). We also include the fraction of shares held by institutions (InstitOwn). Our control for shareholder rights uses the corporate governance index (G-Index) of Gompers et al. (2003) , which is based on twenty-four antitakeover provisions. 14 The results in Table VI indicate that the effect of Union on Spread remains statistically significant and is similar in magnitude to that reported in Table   III , suggesting that the omission of governance variables does not significantly bias our results.
14 The G-Index is available for 1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998 . Since antitakeover provisions vary little over time, we fill in the gaps using the most recent available values. For the period 1983-1989, we use values from 1990.
ENDOGENEITY OF UNIONIZATION
The magnitude of our results may be poorly estimated due to selection bias or measurement error. The magnitude of the effect of unions on bond yields that we measure would be biased upwards if unions self-select to industries which are less risky. For example, since fixed costs of setting up a union are large, unions may be more likely to form in industries that are more likely to survive in the long run and thus are less risky. Conversely, the magnitude would be biased downwards if unions sort into riskier industries. For example, the benefits of unionization may be larger in riskier industries, in which uncertain economic conditions threaten workers' employment and working conditions. Another potential reason for a downward bias could be measurement error, since we use industry-level unionization rates to proxy for firm-level unionization rates.
We use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to examine whether such endogeneity issues cause a significant bias in the estimation of the effect of Union on bond yields. Our instrument for
Union is the logarithm of the fraction of female workers in the firm's CIC industry (Female). The labor economics literature has shown that female workers typically demand less union services than male workers, and as a result, industries with a larger fraction of female workers tend to be less unionized (e.g., Hirsch, 1980) . Female workers are also less likely to unionize because women tend to have less attachment to the labor market and to specific internal job ladders than do men. In addition, the expected benefits (particularly non-wage benefits) from being a union member may be smaller for female workers and their costs of organizing may be higher. Thus, we expect a negative relation between Female and Union in our first-stage regression model. At the same time, Female is unlikely to be correlated with the error term in the second-stage regression model, since there is no obvious reason why it would directly affect bond yields.
In 
THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON THE PRICE AND AMOUNT OF DEBT
Our results can be cast in a general supply and demand framework in which unionization affects both the equilibrium price and amount of debt. In Section 2.1, we argue that, by protecting creditors' wealth, unions cause a reduction in required bond yields for any given level of debt, that is, they cause an increase in the supply of debt to the firm. If this is the only effect of unions, then more unionized firms should exhibit both a lower cost of debt and higher financial leverage.
However, as Simintzi et al. (2009) show, unions may also shift firms' demand for debt in ways that are a priori ambiguous. Hence, the overall effect of unions on bond yields could result from both supply and demand effects. To better understand these effects, we thus need to examine how unions affect the financial leverage of the firms in our sample.
For this purpose, we regress book leverage (Finlev) on unionization (Union) and the standard control variables: firm size (Size), market-to-book ratio (MB), profitability (Profit), asset tangibility (Tangible), cash-flow risk (Cfrisk), and an indicator variable equal one if the firm is a dividend payer (Paysdiv) and zero otherwise. We also include year and one-digit SIC fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors at the CIC level. Although we find that unionization is negatively correlated with book leverage in a univariate regression, the coefficient becomes very close to zero and statistically insignificant once we include other control variables (t-statistic of 0.07). We also estimate year-byyear cross-sectional regressions and find no association between book leverage and unionization.
Our results are similar if we use market leverage instead. Hence, unionization has no impact on the equilibrium leverage of the firms in our sample. This result is in line with those in Lee and Mas (2009) , who find no effect of union election results on book leverage.
We find that unionization reduces bond yields, but does not have a significant impact on financial leverage. Therefore, the supply and demand framework suggests that the increase in the supply of debt to more unionized firms is likely to be accompanied by a simultaneous downward shift in the demand curve. Such an increase in demand would unambiguously generate a reduction in the equilibrium cost of debt, while possibly keeping the equilibrium amount of leverage unchanged.
The reasons for this increase in the supply of debt to more unionized firms follow directly from our conceptual framework in Section 2.1 and our evidence provides strong support for this effect.
A decrease in the demand for debt could arise for two reasons. First, unions make wages sticky and layoffs costly; thus, they increase firms' operating leverage and risk (Chen et al., 2009 ).
Consequently, more unionized firms may choose lower financial leverage to offset their higher operating leverage, effectively reducing their demand for debt (Simintzi et al., 2009 ). In line with this view, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) provide evidence of a negative association between financial and operating leverage. Second, workers are concerned with unemployment risk because they face large costs from layoffs, and are reluctant to invest in firm-specific human capital when this risk is high.
This suggests that unions may induce firms to choose lower financial leverage to reduce the likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy and thus workers' exposure to unemployment risk (see the theoretical work of Berk et al., 2010 , and evidence in Agrawal and Matsa, 2010) .
Evidence on the Mechanism through which Labor Unions Affect Bond Yields
THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON INVESTMENT POLICY
One important way in which labor unions might mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts is by curbing shareholders' incentives to embark on risky projects that expropriate fixed claimants. In particular, shareholders can expropriate bondholders' wealth by investing in negative NPV risky projects that increase share prices but reduce bond values. We argue that such a risk-shifting behavior may be an important concern for workers, because their contractual claims resemble the payoff to risky debt and also because they have a substantial fraction of their wealth invested in firm-specific human capital. As a result, workers' preferences for risk taking are likely to be more closely aligned with those of bondholders than with those of well-diversified shareholders.
If labor unions curb shareholders' incentives to take risk, then firms in more unionized industries should undertake less risky investment policies. However, this prediction is difficult to test because firms' choices of investment projects and their associated risks are not directly observable.
Therefore, we provide some indirect evidence about the nature of firms' project choices. R&D expenditures are typically viewed as riskier investments compared to expenditures on fixed assets.
For example, Kothari et al. (2002) show that R&D expenses increase the variability of future earnings by three to four times more than do expenditures in fixed assets. Thus, we expect more unionized firms to spend a lower fraction of their investment budgets on R&D. Moreover, we expect this effect to be stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions, for which the potential for risk-shifting behavior is larger. (1)- (3) show that firms in more unionized industries spend a smaller fraction of their budgets on R&D.
In columns (4)- (6), we further include interactions of Union with three variables associated with distress risk, previously defined in Section 4.2: LowZS, HighOS, and HighPD. All the variables are demeaned before forming the interactions. The coefficients of all three interaction terms are negative; those of Union×HighOS and Union×HighPD are also statistically significant. These results support the view that unions curb firms' incentives to engage in risky projects that expropriate bondholders, and that their role is especially important in firms in which shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest regarding the risk of investment decisions are more severe. Notably, we find no evidence that when firms are in or near financial distress labor unions align themselves with shareholders in implementing riskier investment policies that could reduce debt values.
THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
Unions may also deter takeovers, which are often associated with changes in firms' contracting relationships that shift wealth from workers to shareholders. 15 This action could lower debt risk because takeovers often entail increases in leverage which reduce the value of existing debt that is not fully protected by covenants. In addition, managers of target companies often engage in defensive maneuvers that can reduce debt values. To explore this possibility, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine whether unions deter takeovers. Second, we examine whether they have a stronger negative effect on bond yields when firms have lower barriers to takeovers. For this 15 At the end of 2009, British and Irish workers at Cadbury, largely organized as a labor union, announced a campaign to resist Kraft's ₤9.8bn ($16.3bn) hostile takeover bid by appealing to shareholders and politicians to block the deal.
purpose, from SDC Platinum we obtain a list of all public and private firms operating in nonfinancial and non-regulated industries that were acquisition targets during the period 1983-2007.
In Table IX , we report the results from industry-level tests in which we use the data for all acquisitions aggregated at the CIC industry level. For industry-year observations with no acquisition targets, we set the number and value of acquisitions to zero. In columns (1) and (2), we report the results from estimating Poisson (count) models relating the number of acquisition bids and the number of completed acquisitions in the industry to the lagged industry unionization rate and industry-level control variables. In column (3), we report the results from estimating a Tobit model that uses the value of completed acquisitions in the industry scaled by the industry's total assets as a dependent variable. The control variables follow from Billett and Xue (2007) and include the CIC industry median of the logarithm of market capitalization (IndLogMcap), the median of the logarithm of the market-to-book equity ratio (IndLogMBE), the median return on assets (IndROA), the median asset tangibility ratio (IndTang), the median leverage (IndFinlev), the fraction of dividend paying firms in the industry (IndDivPay), and the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry (LogNofirms).
16
We cluster standard errors at the CIC industry level and include year fixed effects in all specifications.
We find that the coefficient of Union is negative and statistically significant in all three specifications we consider: In more unionized industries, we observe smaller numbers of acquisition bids and completed acquisitions, as well as lower values of acquisition deals. This evidence suggests that unionization is associated with a less active market for corporate control, and is consistent with the view that unions may benefit lenders by deterring takeovers. 16 The inclusion of the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry controls for the fact that industries with more firms tend to have larger numbers and greater values of acquisitions. We also conduct firm-level tests. To this end, we match the merger targets in SDC to the Merged CRSP-Compustat data, which restricts our sample to publicly traded firms with complete data. We then estimate Probit and Logit models in which we relate the probability that a firm is acquired to lagged unionization rates and the control variables in Billett and Xue (2007) . We also include one-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the CIC industry level. The untabulated results from both specifications provide statistically significant evidence that unionization reduces the probability that a firm is acquired.
Next, we examine whether unions' opposition to acquisitions reduces debt risk. We argue that if unions benefit creditors because they deter takeovers which hurt the value of their claims, then their influence on firms' decisions should be more beneficial to the creditors of firms which are not protected by state antitakeover laws. To examine this issue, in Panel A of Table X , we report results from estimating our benchmark regression model separately for firms with high (above median) and low (below median) values of the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (G-Index), which largely captures antitakeover provisions. The effect of unions on the cost of debt is significantly more negative for firms with low levels of takeover protection (low G-Index). Furthermore, the coefficient of Union in the low G-Index subsample is statistically significant at the 1% level, while in the high GIndex subsample it is only marginally significant, at the 10% level. These results are consistent with the view that unions reduce creditors' risk exposure by deterring takeovers, especially when formal takeover barriers do not exist.
In Panel B, we further examine whether unions' role in blocking takeovers is more important in financially distressed firms. If this were the case, then unions should reduce the cost of debt in financially distressed firms by more when the firm has lower barriers to takeovers. For this purpose,
we estimate our benchmark model separately for firms with G-Index above and below median, and also include an interaction term between Union and three alternative indicators for whether a firm is in financial distress: LowSC, HighOS, and HighPD. All our empirical models include CIC industry and year fixed effects. Our evidence is mixed: While the coefficient of the interaction Union x HighOS is significantly more negative for firms with low G-Index, which suggests that unions' role in blocking takeovers is more valuable to lenders in distressed firms which lack antitakeover provisions, the coefficient of the interaction term does not differ across firms with high and low G-Index if we measure distress using LowZS or HighPD.
OTHER POSSIBLE MECHANISMS
Labor unions may also affect creditors' wealth through other mechanisms, two of which stand out the most. First, strong unions might have political influence and play an important role in company bailouts (e.g., during the recent financial crisis, unions at General Motors received considerable support from President Obama). This suggests that unions may also reduce bond yields partly because they are very effective in mobilizing the media and politicians to the rescue of firms in trouble. To evaluate this political-power hypothesis, we start from the premise that, due to a historical alliance between the labor movement and the Democratic Party, Democratic governments are more likely to support unionized firms in trouble. If this is indeed the case, then the presence of strong unions should reduce the cost of debt by more when the Democrats are in power.
To this end, we estimate our main empirical model including an interaction term between Union and Democrat, an indicator variable for whether unions are likely to enjoy support from Democratic governments. We consider two versions of Democrat. In the first case, Democrat equals one during the time periods in which the US President is from the Democratic Party; in the second case, Democrat equals one during the time periods in which the Governor of the state in which the firm's primary operations are located is from the Democratic Party. 17 Despite its intuitive appeal, we do not find 17 The advantage of using the first measure is that the President has likely more impact in orchestrating corporate bailouts; the disadvantage is that it varies only over time. The other measure varies both in the time series and across states, but governors may have less power to support troubled firms. statistically significant support for the political-power hypothesis: The negative effect of unions on the cost of debt is not stronger when government officials affiliated with the Democratic Party are in power. A plausible explanation of this result is that governments often provide financial support to large firms like GM, but not to smaller firms that are more typical in our sample. This could reduce the power of our tests.
Second, our arguments largely suggest that unions' influence on corporate affairs reduces the probability of default on debt payments, but the interest of workers and creditors may sometimes be in conflict in financial distress. Specifically, as discussed in Section 2.1, workers who fear losing their income streams and firm-specific human capital investments may side with shareholders in trying to keep the firm alive. This bias towards an inefficient continuation instead of an efficient liquidation could in fact reduce the firm's liquidation value and reduce the value of creditors' claims as a result.
It is empirically difficult to examine this plausible mechanism directly. But our evidence that unions decrease bond yields, and even by more in financial distress, suggests that the net effect of labor unions' actions is to reduce the risk of debt. This result implies that workers' incentives to favor an inefficient continuation are unlikely to have a large effect on creditors' wealth.
Additional Tests
In this section, we discuss the results of various additional robustness tests for our main specification in Table III . Details of each test are available upon request.
SIMULTANEOUS DETERMINATION OF SPREADS AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE
Both financial leverage and bond yield spreads could be jointly determined by firms' unionization rates. However, this is unlikely to severely bias the effect of Union on Spread we document. First, in all regression models we control for financial leverage. Thus, the coefficient of Union captures the effect of unionization on spreads independently of any effect it may have through its effect on leverage. If we omit leverage from the regression, the coefficient of Union captures the effect of unionization including any effect it may have through its effect on leverage. However, this omission has a negligible impact on the coefficient of Union, which suggests that an association between unionization and leverage does not drive our results.
Second, we replace a firm's leverage by more exogenous measures: the CIC-industry median leverage and a firm's initial leverage (the firm's leverage recorded the first year the firm's appears in the Compustat database). Several studies have shown that industry leverage predicts firm leverage and Lemmon et al. (2008) show that a firm's initial leverage has significant power to predict its future leverage. These leverage variables are less likely to be simultaneously determined with a firm's current yield spread. Using these measures of leverage does not affect the coefficient of Union.
Third, we use a firm's initial leverage as an instrument for its contemporaneous leverage in a 2SLS framework. As discussed above, initial leverage is a strong predictor of future leverage. It is less obvious why this variable, based on information which is distant in the past, should predict current yield spreads, other than through its ability to predict a firm's current leverage. We find that the coefficient of initial leverage is not statistically significant when we include both current leverage and initial leverage in the same regression model. This result suggests that initial leverage is correctly excluded from the second-stage regression model and thus can serve as an instrument in the first stage. The 2SLS coefficient of Union is almost the same as that from the OLS regression model.
Hence, it is unlikely that the endogeneity of leverage explains our results.
NONLINEARITIES IN FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND CREDIT RATINGS
We explore if the results in our main specification are affected by nonlinearities in book leverage or credit ratings. First, in our regression model, we include a quadratic term of book leverage. Second, we use a specification in which we split leverage into three indicator variables based on its empirical distribution (high, medium, and low leverage). Third, we replace the continuous rating variable by a dummy for each of the following rating categories: D to CCC+, B-to BB+, BBB-to A+, and AA-to AAA+. Fourth, we also compare the results using the continuous rating variable in our benchmark specification to those we obtain using both this variable and its squared term. In all the specifications, we find that our main results remain largely unaffected.
NONLINEARITIES IN UNIONIZATION
The relation between Union and Spread may be non-linear (U-shaped). This can happen for two reasons. First, an increase in unionization may substantially increase unions' ability to influence firms' decisions in firms that initially have low unionization rates. When unionization is already high, further increases in unionization rates may not be as effective in increasing the influence of workers.
Second, although some influence of unions on corporate decisions may benefit bondholders, excessive power may allow unions to pursue their own agendas and destroy firm value. To evaluate this possibility we add Union 2 to our benchmark empirical model; we find no evidence that the effect of Union on Spread weakens at higher levels of unionization.
CASH-FLOW RISK
In our main specification, we include a coarse proxy for risk-shifting behavior by shareholders:
cash-flow risk. To the extent unions affect the cost of debt through their impact on this risk-shifting behavior, one would expect that controlling for cash-flow risk should diminish the effect of Union on Spread. This is indeed the case: Including Cflowrisk in the regression model reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of Union from -224.133 to -186.862 (a 15% drop in value). Thus, consistent with the view that unions affect firms' risk taking, we find that differences in cash-flow risk across firms capture some of the effect of unions on bond yield spreads. Nonetheless, the coefficient of Union remains statistically significant and economically large even after including Cflowrisk. This is likely because this variable is an imperfect measure of shareholders' unobservable risk-shifting incentives and because unions also affect bond yields through other channels such as by deterring takeovers.
SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS
Although we aim to study the relation between unionization and bond yields for the entire population of firms, our data only includes firms covered by the LBBD. If the criteria for inclusion in the LBBD favor firms with certain attributes, then our sample may not be a random draw from the population and our results may not hold for the entire population. We address this concern using the Heckman (1979) procedure. We first estimate a Probit model of the probability that a firm is contained in the LBBD data using all firms in the merged CRSP-Compustat database over our sample period. Our predictors are firm size and indicator variables for whether the firm has rated debt, is included in the S&P500 index, or it trades on NASDAQ. We then control for selection bias by including the Inverse Mills Ratio from this Probit in the second-stage regression model projecting
Spread on Union and the control variables. The coefficient of Union remains statistically significant and similar in magnitude to that in the benchmark OLS specification.
MULTI-SEGMENT FIRMS
To construct our key test variable, we assign each firm the unionization rate corresponding to its CIC industry, which we identify using the firm's primary SIC code. This procedure gives a precise matching for single-segment firms. However, it may not be accurate for multi-segment firms, whose operations span several industries with different unionization rates. To address this concern, we repeat our analysis using the employee-weighted unionization rate averaged across the industries corresponding to each of the firm's business segments. The results are similar to our benchmark results, both in terms of their magnitude and statistical significance.
INCLUDING TWO-DIGIT SIC INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS
In our main specification, we control for unobservable industry characteristics using one-digit SIC industry fixed effects. We repeat our regressions using two-digit SIC fixed effects instead. The benefit of this estimation approach is that it mitigates the concern that unobservable differences across industries may bias our inference. However, the cost is that it ignores the large variation in unionization rates across two-digit SIC industries. The effect of unionization on yields remains statistically significant and similar in magnitude to that reported in Table III .
ALTERNATIVE CLUSTERING METHODS
Throughout the paper we calculate the statistical significance of our coefficients using standard errors clustered at the CIC industry level. To evaluate whether this method indeed provides the most conservative values of standard errors, we estimate our main specification clustering standard errors by both CIC industry and year. The coefficients retain similar statistical significance. We also explore clustering by firm, year, and both firm and year, with no detriment to our original findings.
Conclusion
We examine how workers' influence on corporate affairs affects the pricing of corporate public debt. Using industry labor unionization as a proxy for workers' influence, we find that: (1) Firms in more unionized industries have statistically and economically significant lower bond yield spreads;
(2) The negative effect of unions on bond yields is stronger in firms that have weak financial conditions; (3) Higher unionization is associated with a smaller fraction of investment budgets allocated to R&D than to physical assets, especially in firms that are close to financial distress; and (4) Higher unionization is associated with a lower likelihood that a firm is an acquisition target and unionization reduces bond yield spreads by more when firms' takeover barriers are lower.
Our evidence supports the view that, by attempting to preserve the value of their contractually fixed claims and the value of their human capital investments in the firm, unionized workers also protect bondholders' and other fixed claimants' wealth. Hence, our results suggest that the value of any particular fixed claim on a firm's cash flow depends on the extent to which other stakeholders with fixed-payoff contracts are able to monitor the firm's decision-making process. We also show that while previous work finds that unions decrease equity values, they nevertheless increase debt values. We provide an economic rationale for why that is the case. Our evidence highlights the need to study the effects of non-financial stakeholders on debt and equity values separately.
Our work motivates further investigation of the question whether other non-financial stakeholders who are largely fixed claimants, such as firms' customers and suppliers, may also influence corporate policies that affect creditors' wealth. More broadly, our findings suggest that more detailed information about the nature of the relation between a firm and its various stakeholders might be useful for investors in assessing the value and risk of debt-like financial claims. This is a fruitful area for future research. This table reports the time-series averages (over the 15 years in our sample period) of the industry unionization rate (in %) and the industry debt yield spread (in basis points) for selected Census Industry Classification (CIC) industries. The unionization rate (defined at the industry level) is the fraction of the industry's workers covered by unions in their collective bargaining with the firm. For each year, the industry debt yield spread is the average yield spreads across all firms in the industry. Based on the time-series average of unionization rates, we identify the ten most and least unionized among the 145 industries corresponding to different CICs contained in our data. The sample spans the period 1984-1998 and contains 5,557 observations corresponding to 996 non-financial and nonutility firms. Spread is the yield spread in basis points, defined as the difference between the weighted-average yield to maturity on the firm's outstanding debt and the yield to maturity on a Treasury security with similar duration; Union is the fraction of workers in the Census Industry Classification (CIC) that are covered by unions in the collective bargaining with the firm; Size is firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firms' debt outstanding plus the market value of equity; Finlev is financial leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by total assets; TobQ is the marketto-book ratio, defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets; Cfrisk is the standard deviation of quarterly ROA using the 15 previous quarters; Intcov1 is an indicator variable equal to one if interest coverage, defined as operating cash-flow divided by interest payments, is less than one, and zero otherwise; Profit is profitability, defined as operating income divided by assets; Negequity is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm's book equity is negative, and zero otherwise; Intang is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets; NWC is net working capital divided by total assets; Totpayout is the total payout to shareholders, including dividends and repurchases, divided by total assets; Productivity is the productivity of a firm's assets, defined as sales divided by assets; HHI is the Herfindahl index of sales concentration in the firm's three-digit SIC industry; Nasdaq is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm trades on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise; Duration is the weighted-average duration of outstanding debt; Debtage is the weightedaverage difference between the settlement date and the original bond issue date; Rating is an index of the firm's debt rating, defined as the weighted-average S&P's credit rating at the date of the yield observation (it takes a value of 1 for ratings D to CC, 2 for CCC-to CCC+, 3 for B-to B+, 4 for BB-to BB+, 5 for BBB-to BBB+, 6 for A-to A+, 7 for AA-to AA+, and 8 for AAA to AAA+). Size, Finlev, TobQ, Cfrisk, Intcov1, Profit, Negequity, Intang, NWC, Totpayout, Productivity, HHI, Nasdaq, Duration, Debtage, and Rating. See Table II for detailed definitions of all variables. All regressions include one-digit SIC industry fixed effects (SIC1 FE) and year fixed effects (Year FE). The absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
High-Unionization Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table II : Size, Finlev, TobQ, Cfrisk, Intcov1, Profit, Negequity, Intang, NWC, Totpayout, Productivity, HHI, Nasdaq, Duration, Debtage, and Rating. Distress is a generic indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in financial distress, and zero otherwise. In each specification we use an alternative indicator or financial ditress: Intcov1 equals one for firms with interest coverage ratios less than one; Negequity equals one for firms with negative equity; LowZS equals one if a firm's default risk based on Altman's (1968) z-score is in the top tercile of the empirical distribution (lower z-scores are associated with higher default risk); HighOS equals one if a firm's default risk based on Ohlson's (1980) o-score is in the top tercile of the empirical distribution (higher o-scores are associated with higher default risk); and HighPD equals one if a firm's probability of default derived from the Merton (1974) bond-pricing model as suggested by Bharath and Shumway (2008) is in the top tercile of the empirical distribution. We demean Union and each of the above financial distress indicators before forming the interaction terms. All regressions include CIC industry fixed effects (CIC FE) and year fixed effects (Year FE). The coefficients of the standard control variables are omitted for brevity unless they are interacted with Union. The absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table II for detailed definitions of these variables). We also include industry-level control variables. Indlogage is the logarithm of the age of the oldest firm in a CIC industry; Oldecon is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm operates in an "old-economy" industry, and zero otherwise. Old-economy industries are defined as industries with SIC codes less than 4000 that are not in the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking industries; Newecon is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm operates in a "new-economy" industry, and zero otherwise; New-economy industries are defined to comprise firms in the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking industries; Indkl is the capital-labor ratio in the firm's CIC industry, defined as fixed assets divided by the number of employees (we divide this number by 1000); Indrdexp is the median ratio of R&D expenses to sales in a CIC industry; Indadvexp is the median ratio of advertising expenses to sales in a CIC industry; 1yr-Indgrwth is the median one-year growth in the logarithm of firm assets in a CIC industry; Indprofit is the median ROA in a CIC industry; Indretearn is the median ratio of retained earnings to assets in a CIC industry; College is the fraction of the CIC industry's workers that have some college education; and Hours is the average number of hours worked by the workers in the CIC industry. All regressions include one-digit SIC industry fixed effects (SIC1 FE) and year fixed effects (Year FE). We omit the coefficients of the control variables from the benchmark specification for brevity. The absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table II for detailed definitions of these variables). We also include corporate governance control variables. Top5 is the fraction of the institutional ownership accounted for by the 5 largest institutional investors; InstitOwn is the fractional ownership of institutions; and G-Index is the firm's corporate governance index based on antitakeover provisions constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . All regressions include one-digit SIC industry fixed effects (SIC1 FE) and year fixed effects (Year FE). We omit the coefficients of the control variables from the benchmark specification for brevity. The absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table II for detailed definitions of the other control variables. We also include interactions of Union with alternative indicator variables for whether a firm is financially distressed which are defined in Table IV : LowZS, HighOS, and HighPD. We demean Union and each of the above financial distress indicators before forming the interaction terms. All regressions include one-digit SIC industry fixed effects (SIC1 FE) and year fixed effects (Year FE). The absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table II . IndLogMCap is the industry median of the logarithm of market capitalization; IndLogMBE is the industry median of the logarithm of the market-to-book equity ratio; IndROA is the industry median ROA; IndTang is the industry median ration of fixed assets to total assets; IndDivPay is the fraction of dividend paying firms in the industry; IndFinlev is the industry median book leverage; and LogNoFirms is the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry. All regressions include year fixed effects (Year FE). The absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table 4 : LowZS, HighOS, and HighPD. We demean Union and each of the above financial distress indicators before forming the interaction terms. All regressions include CIC industry fixed effects (CIC FE) and year fixed effects (Year FE). Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the results for firms with G-Index above the sample median and Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the results for firms with G-Index below the sample median. The coefficients of the standard control variables are omitted for brevity unless they are interacted with Union. In both panels, the absolute values of the t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the CIC industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
